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Vulnerability assessment is a promising approach to identifying critical components of complex 
systems. In such systems, critical components could be crucial links and strategic locations for 
management and control. Managing those components better could, in turn, improve or 
reinforce a system‟s resilience to shock events. However, fully comprehensive vulnerability 
assessments cannot be guaranteed as enumerating all possible shock events in complex systems 
is computationally intensive and almost infeasible. Consequently, the important role of some 
components might be neglected. This paper explores the feasibility of using a dual approach 
vulnerability assessment for water distribution systems (WDSs). Specifically, complex network 
analysis (e.g. community detection) and control-theory-based analysis (e.g. controllability 
analysis) is utilized to identify critical components within WDSs. A real-world benchmark 
water distribution system is mapped into either undirected or directed graphs by identifying 
critical pipes and nodes respectively. Here, critical links refer to pipes linking all the 
subsystems of a WDS together. Critical nodes are defined as actuators based on analogy with 
control theory. Controlling a suitable set of actuators by different signals can offer full control 
over a dynamical system. The results from the two different methods are discussed with respect 
to the criticality of the identified components to water supply during failure, and the 
correlations among the alternative approaches. It is concluded that, although there is a much 
larger number of actuators, about 77% of critical links are also identified as actuator pipes 
(pipes with either of its end points as actuators) and therefore they have the same criticality. For 
the remaining 23%, the location of critical links is rather close to that of actuators despite 
differences in criticality. Further study is ongoing to confirm whether any other actuators 
unexplored in this study could be more critical than the studied actuators and critical links or 




Water distribution systems (WDS) are conventionally designed and rehabilitated to be reliable. 
Here, a reliable system is able to deliver a defined level of service over its design life when 
subject to a given threat. Nevertheless, the system should also be resilient to unexpected threats. 
It is further argued that reliability and resilience are foundational in moving towards „Safe & 
SuRe‟ water systems [1]. In order to build resilience, based on reliability, it is necessary to 
know which parts of the network are vulnerable and some means of identifying critical 
components is required.  This has conventionally been achieved using graph theory [2-10]. This 
study explores the feasibility of using two graph approaches [11, 12] for identifying critical 
links and crucial control locations of water distribution systems, respectively. On the basis of 
analysis results, the correlation between the two different sets of critical components is 
discussed in respect of their application to WDS management and control, especially for WDS 
resilience to threats. Note that the critical links refer to interconnections between subsystems of 
a WDS. Here, the subsystems are clusters, formed along with urban development, serving 
corresponding communities (e.g. residential zones, industrial sites, business center, etc.) in the 
urban area [11]. Therefore, in this study, critical links are not constrained to hydraulically 
critical pipes but are important links providing clues for comprehensive understanding of the 
WDSs‟ properties. For instance, the critical links and the corresponding cluster structure could 
be first detected and then be used to identify all the most hydraulic critical pipes [11]. The 
crucial control locations are nodes acting as actuators defined in control theory [12]. 
Controlling a suitable set of actuators by different signals can offer full control over a 




The critical links and actuators are identified by the modularity-based clustering method and 
controllability analysis, respectively. 
 
Modularity-based clustering 
The modularity-based clustering method, originating from complex network research [13], is 
applied to decompose water distribution systems into clusters formed along with urban 
development [11]. Each cluster is a subsystem mainly serving a city block. The critical links are 
pipes connecting the clusters. There are two steps for modularity-based clustering of water 
distribution systems: (1) Water distribution system mapping: The distribution system is mapped 
into an undirected graph  EVG ,  in which the vertices V  represent the consumers, 
sources, and tanks - the edges E  the connecting pipes, pumps, and valves [5]; (2) The cluster 
layout of G  is identified by using an algorithm proposed by Clauset et al. [13]. The method 
maximizes modularity ( Q ) to get optimal division, as Q  is an indicator to quantify the quality 
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where A  is an element of the adjacency matrix of the network ( 1A  if vertices  and 
  are connected, and 0A  otherwise).   Am 2
1
 is the total number of edges; 
   Ak  is the degree of vertex  , defined as the number of edges connected to that 
vertex;   cc ,  is 1 if  cc  , and 0 otherwise. c  and c  represents two different 
clusters;  and   represents vertices in c  and c  respectively. For more details about the 
algorithm, refer to the studies by Clauset et al. [13] and Diao et al. [11]. 
 
Controllability analysis 
The crucial control locations, termed as actuators or driver nodes, are located through 
controllability analysis. The controllability of complex water distribution systems is explored 
based on a differential equation [12]: 
 
 
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dt
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where the vector       txtxtx N,,1   represents the state of a system of N  nodes at time 
t . The NN  matrix A  describes the system‟s wiring diagram and the interaction strength 
between the components, for instance the flow rate in pipes in water distribution systems. B  is 
the MN   matrix ( NM   ) that identifies the actuators controlled by an outside controller. 
Finally, the time-dependent input vector       TM tututu ,,1   denotes the control signals 
imposed by the controller. Generally, the same  tu1  can drive multiple nodes. To control the 
system‟s dynamics, it is essential to identify the set of actuators that, if fed by signals, can offer 
full control over the system. The minimum number of actuators is denoted as DN . If a system 
described by equation (2) is controllable, it can be driven from any initial state to any desired 
final state in finite time. This is possible if and only if the NMN   controllability matrix 
 BABAABBC N 12 ,,,,    has a full rank, that is   NCrank  . 
Three steps are necessary for identifying actuators in WDSs: (1) Water distribution systems 
mapping: According to link flow directions from model simulation, the distribution system is 
mapped into a series of directed graphs  TdMdd GGG ,,1   with each one referring to the 
system status at a single simulation time step M . The vertices and links share the same 
meaning as the undirected graph G  introduced above. (2) Controllability analysis: 
Controllability analysis is made for each graph 
d
iG  to obtain one set of actuators. 3) Identifying 
the minimum number of actuators: Finally, the minimum number of actuators is the cardinality 
of the intersection of the set of actuators for every graph. In other words, the actuators that 
coincide for different graphs are accounted for just once. More details of the whole process 




The case study of both methods focuses on a real-world water distribution system, C-Town [15]. 
The system is composed of 5 district metered areas (DMAs) with a pump station and tank(s) 
configured in each DMA. The hydraulic model of the system consists of 444 pipes and 396 
nodes (Figure 1). The hydraulic simulation period is 168 hours (i.e. one week). 
 
Identification of critical links and actuators 
In terms of critical link identification, 22 critical links are identified by dividing the C-Town 
network into 20 clusters [Figure 2(A)]. In terms of actuator identification, the system is mapped 
into 168 directed graphs [   168,,,1  MGGG
Td
M
dd  ] using pipe flow directions at all time 




Figure 1. The layout of C-Town water distribution system 
 
 
Figure 2. (A) The cluster structure and critical links (B) Layout of actuators 
 
 
Comparisons on the criticality of critical links and actuators 
The criticality of critical links is compared with that of actuator pipes (i.e. pipes with either of 
its end nodes identified as actuators) in order to deepen insights into their correlations, if any. 
This study considers the failure shock for criticality comparison. Specifically, the criticality of a 
component is evaluated by two metrics: 1) the demand shortage resulting from failure of that 
component (e.g. modeled as a closed pipe during simulation) and 2) time to failure of clusters 
(TTFC). Failure of cluster means there is no water supply in the cluster. The demand shortage is 
the actual supplied demand during a failure event minus the total demand required. The actual 
supplied demand is a sum of actual nodal demands that is estimated based on the following 
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where  tq ji, — the estimated actual nodal demand at junction i  when component j  is 
closed; )(td — the expected nodal demand at junction i ; minP — the required minimum 
pressure for delivering demand )(td ; nP — the actual pressure at junction i . 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
As Figure 2 shows, most of critical links (i.e. 17 out of 22) have at least one end node identified 
as an actuator (labeled with a green color). Hence, the natural boundaries of WDSs, detected by 
clustering, may not only be the places locating critical links but also important control points. In 
non-identical cases, critical links and actuator pipes are very close to each other despite 
differences in criticality. Moreover, analyzing the properties of the WDS could address the 
origin of the differences in criticality. Comparisons on three typical cases are introduced and 
discussed. In the first case (1
st
 comparison annotated in Figure 2), the critical link is identical to 





comparisons annotated in Figure 2), the critical links and actuator pipes are next to each other. 
The failure is assumed to occur at 12 hours after the simulation starts, since high water demand 
is reached at that time and more importantly the peak lasts for several hours afterwards. 
As for the 1
st
 comparison, since the critical link and the actuator pipe are identical, only the 
criticality of the pipe is analyzed. The critical link (pipe P25) is the interconnection between the 
most upstream cluster and the rest part of the system. Since the most upstream cluster is where 
the only reservoir is located, a break of the critical link would isolate the water source from the 
system. In this regard, both the graph approaches identified this link as a crucial place for 
management and control. As further demonstrated by the results (Figure 3), a break of P25 
would result in almost total loss of water supply with a 6 hour TTFC. Note that the TTFC is 
event-dependent. For instance, the TTFC would be shortened to 3 hours if the break of P25 
happens at 118 hours after the simulation begins. 
 
 
Figure 3. The 1
st
 comparison— identical critical links and actuator pipes 
 
 
Figure 4. The 2
nd
 comparison— non-identical critical link P524 and actuator pipe P527 
 
In the case 2 both the critical link (P524) and the actuator pipe (P527) are located on the 
path between the reservoir to the tank in DMA2. Given the comparisons in Figure 4, the failure 
of the actuator pipe (P527) leads to larger demand shortage and shorter TTFC (11 hrs) than that 
of P524 (TTFC=24 hrs). The difference in criticality lies in the fact that, the failure of P527 
isolates one extra region [the yellow area in Figure 5(B)] with high nodal demands. 
Subsequently, the total demand in isolated area is nearly doubled than the original case [Figure 
5(A)] and the Tank T4 therefore runs out of water much faster. In the 3
rd
 case demand shortage 
due to failure of the critical link (P995) is slightly higher than the actuator pipe (P994). Note 
that as both pipes have no significant impacts on water supply, the comparison on demand 
shortage is not included. There are two reasons for the limited impacts. First, both pipes are 
located at the secondary path (Figure 6) with comparatively smaller capacity than the primary 
one. Second, the elevation of the downstream node of the critical link is 22.65 meters higher 
than that of the upstream node. Subsequently, the average quantity of water delivered by the 
primary path is more than twice as that of the secondary path. The TTFC is 0 hour (P995) and 6 
hours (P994) respectively. This is because failure of P995 will block both the secondary and the 
third path in Figure 6 instead of the secondary path only as a result of the failure of P994.   
 
 
Figure 5. The 2
nd








This study explores the feasibility of using two graph theory approaches to the vulnerability 
assessment of water distribution systems, with emphasis on identifying critical components to 
inspire a better understanding of the properties and behaviors of WDSs from the perspective of 
building resilience for „Safe & SuRe‟ water systems. The modularity-based clustering method is 
applied to identify the critical links in WDSs, while controllability analysis is carried out for 
locating actuators. Comparisons of the criticality of those identified components are made and 
reveal that although there are a much larger number of actuators, most of the critical links (77%) 
have identical criticality to actuators, and hence critical links located at natural boundaries of 
WDSs may also be crucial control components. In non-identical cases, critical links and 
actuators are very close to each other, and the origin of their differences in criticality is 
confirmable.  Further study is ongoing to compare the criticality of actuators undetected in this 
study with the studied ones to confirm if any more critical components have been neglected. In 
addition, the performance of the two methods will be further tested by considering different 
failures. 
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